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Abstract. This paper presents a critical analysis of the AACS drive-
host authentication scheme. A few weaknesses are identiﬁed which could
lead to various attacks on the scheme. In particular, we observe that
the scheme is susceptible to unknown key-share and man-in-the-middle
attacks. Modiﬁcations of the scheme are suggested in order to provide
better security. A proof of security of the modiﬁed scheme is also pre-
sented. The modiﬁed scheme achieves better eﬃciency than the original
scheme.
1 Introduction
Advanced Access Content System (AACS) is a content distribution system for
recordable and pre-recorded media. It has been developed by eight compa-
nies: Disney, IBM, Intel, Matsushita (Panasonic), Microsoft, Sony, Toshiba, and
Warner Brothers. Most notably, AACS is used to protect the next generation of
high deﬁnition optical discs such as Blu-ray and HD-DVD.
To design a media protection scheme that is able to run on open platforms
like PCs, designers have to make sure that the scheme is not susceptible to the
“virtual device attack”. A virtual device can mimic a physical hardware device
in all respects, so that the CPU is tricked into believing that a device exists when
actually it does not. To deploy a virtual device attack on a media system such
as the DVD playback system, the attacker can build software that implements a
virtual DVD drive. The content of the optical disc is moved onto the computer’s
hard drive as a disc image. The attacker can then play back this “DVD disc”
through the virtual DVD drive on a legitimate DVD player software.
The attacker can certainly duplicate the disc image into multiple copies and
disseminate them illegally, even though he never learns the content of the DVD
in the clear. In order to defend against this attack, the drive has to have the
ability to prove to the host (e.g. the playback software) that it is a legitimate
drive. This can be done through a cryptographic authentication protocol.
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which means that the drive proves to the host its legitimate identity and the host
has to prove its identity to the drive. After the drive and the host complete a
successful session of the protocol, a shared secret key is established between
them. Therefore, AACS drive-host mutual authentication protocol is combined
with a key agreement protocol. The shared secret key is then used for message
authentication purposes.
1.1 Mutual Authentication Protocol and Key Agreement Protocol
In a mutual authentication protocol, the two participating entities need to prove
their identities to each other. If an entity has successfully proven its identity to
the other entity, the other entity is required to “accept”. A session of a mutual
authentication protocol is a successfully completed session if both participants
have accepted by the end of the session. Mutual authentication protocols can be
devised by using either symmetric or asymmetric key cryptographic primitives.
Stinson [13, Chapter 9] provides some good studies on mutual authentication
protocols.
After two entities have authenticated themselves to each other, most likely
they will want to communicate with each other. It therefore makes sense to
combine a key agreement protocol with a mutual authentication protocol, be-
cause a shared secret key provides conﬁdentiality and/or data integrity to both
communicating entities. In a key agreement protocol, both entities contribute in-
formation which is used to derive a shared secret key. A key agreement protocol
most often uses asymmetric-key primitives.
A key agreement protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication to
both entity A and entity B if A is assured that no one other than B can possibly
learn the value of the shared secret key (likewise, B is assured that no one
other than A can learn the value of the key). Note that this property does
not necessarily mean that A is assured of B actually possessing the key nor
is A assured that B can actually compute the key. A key agreement protocol
with implicit key authentication is called an authenticated key agreement (AK)
protocol.
A key agreement protocol is said to provide implicit key conﬁrmation if A
is assured that B can compute the secret key while no others can, and vice
versa. A protocol provides explicit key conﬁrmation if A is assured that B has
computed the secret key and no one other than B can compute the key, and vice
versa. A key agreement protocol that provides key conﬁrmation (either implicit
or explicit) to both participating entities is called an authenticated key agreement
with key conﬁrmation (AKC) protocol. For example, explicit key conﬁrmation
can be achieved by using the newly derived key to encrypt a known value and to
send it to the other entity. In most cases, using a key agreement protocol with
implicit key conﬁrmation is suﬃcient. For more information on key agreement
protocols, please refer to [13, Chapter 11].1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we present a rigorous analysis of the AACS drive-host authenti-
cation scheme. Speciﬁcally, we identify a few weaknesses present in the scheme
which could lead to various attacks. It is yet to be known whether those weak-
nesses will lead to piracy of multimedia content. Nevertheless, we believe that it is
not desirable for such a widely-deployed system to employ a weak cryptographic
protocol if it can be made secure fairly easily. We propose an improvement of
the original scheme based on the well-established Station-to-Station key agree-
ment protocol. The improved scheme provides secure mutual authentication as
well as authenticated key agreement with key conﬁrmation. We also discuss the
security of the improved scheme. The improved scheme is designed with the goal
of requiring little change to be made to the original scheme, so implementation
of the improved scheme is straightforward. In addition, the improved scheme
requires less interaction between the drive and the host, and therefore it is more
eﬃcient than the original scheme. Furthermore, our improved scheme can be
easily implemented on other content distribution systems such as CSS [7] and
CPPM [1] which also use weak drive-host authentication schemes.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2, we introduce the AACS drive-host authentication scheme. Our
analysis of the AACS drive-host authentication scheme is presented in Section
3, where we identify several weaknesses in the scheme and provide corresponding
improvements. In Section 4, we discuss the security of the improved drive-host
authentication scheme, followed by a conclusion in Section 5.
2 AACS Drive-Host Authentication scheme
When using AACS in a PC-based system where the drive and the host are sep-
arate entities, both the drive and the host are issued certiﬁcates from the AACS
LA (AACS Licensing Administrator). This allows either entity to verify whether
or not the other is trustworthy and in compliance with the AACS speciﬁcations.
These certiﬁcates, called the drive certiﬁcate and host certiﬁcate, each contain
ﬁelds stating the capabilities of the device, a unique identiﬁer, the device’s public
key, and a signature from the AACS LA verifying the integrity of the certiﬁcate
signed with an AACS LA private key. Both the drive and the host have the
corresponding AACS LA public key for signature veriﬁcation. A full description
of the certiﬁcate format can be found in the AACS Introduction and Common
Cryptographic Elements speciﬁcation [2, Chapter 4].
Authentication between the drive and the host occurs each time new media
is placed into the drive. This is necessary because the new disc may contain
updated revocation lists. Each compliant disc contains a data structure called
the media key block (MKB), which holds the necessary information needed to
derive the keys to decrypt the content. It also contains the latest drive revocationlist (DRL) and host revocation list (HRL) which, respectively, contain a list of
IDs of the revoked drives and a list of IDs of the revoked hosts. A drive may
only communicate with a host that has not been revoked, and a host may only
communicate with a drive that has not been revoked.
A detailed description of the AACS drive-host authentication scheme can be
found in [2, Section 4.3]. The original scheme consists a total of twenty-nine steps.
A simpliﬁed version consisting only the core steps involved in authentication and
key agreement is shown in Figure 2.
After successfully completing the drive-host authentication algorithm, the
drive and the host have established a shared bus key based on an elliptic curve
Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol [11]. It is interesting to note that while
this key could be used to encrypt messages between the drive and the host, it is
not actually used for this purpose. Instead, the bus key is used solely for message
authentication by including a MAC for any message traveling between the drive
and the host. The current AACS speciﬁcations do not require either the drive
or the host to be capable of encrypting and decrypting bus messages; however
there is a ﬂag in each certiﬁcate stating whether or not an entity is capable of
performing bus encryption.
3 Analysis of the AACS Drive-Host Authentication
scheme
In this section, we analyze the AACS drive-host authentication scheme. Several
weaknesses are identiﬁed which could lead to various attacks, and corresponding
improvements are provided to strengthen the original scheme.
Our discussion of security is based on the standard security model for au-
thentication and key agreement schemes, which was ﬁrst proposed by Bellare
and Rogaway in the symmetric-key setting [4]. Blake-Wilson et al. later gen-
eralized this model into the public-key setting [6]. In the standard model, the
adversary has enormous power and controls all communication between entities.
The adversary can read, modify, create, delay and replay messages, and he/she
can initiate new sessions at any time.
3.1 Weakness 1: Design Error
This weakness is present in the ﬁrst four steps of the drive-host authentication
scheme. Suppose that the DRL in the MKB is newer than the DRL stored in
the host. A malicious party, Oscar, can change the MKB version number to an
older one, and send the modiﬁed MKB
0 to the host. This modiﬁcation might
not be detected during the authentication procedure, because according to the
speciﬁcation, the host ﬁrst checks the MKB version number, and if the version
number is older than its DRL’s, it skips over step 2, which involves verifying the
signature on the DRL in the MKB.Drive Oscar Host
MKB − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
MKB
0
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
If the drive has already been revoked, it could maliciously alter the MKB
version number in order not to let the host update its DRL, so that it can keep
interacting with the host.
The altered MKB might eventually be detected when the host processes the
MKB during content decryption. However, it is undesirable for a revoked drive
to be able to talk to the host until then.
The ﬁx to this weakness is simple: The host should verify the MKB and DRL
signatures before checking the version numbers. The same modiﬁcation can be
made to the drive side. Figure 1 shows the modiﬁcation.
Drive Host
1. MKB // Verify MKB and DRL signa-
tures. Abort if signatures are
not valid.
2. Compare version of stored DRL
to DRL in MKB. If DRL in
MKB is not newer, use stored
DRL. Otherwise, use DRL in
MKB, and store it for later ref-
erence.
3. Verify MKB and HRL signa-
tures. Abort if signatures are
not valid.
4. Compare version of stored HRL
to HRL in MKB. If HRL in
MKB is not newer, use stored
HRL. Otherwise, use HRL in
MKB, and store it for later ref-
erence.
Fig.1. Improved First Four Steps
3.2 Weakness 2: Unknown Key-Share Attack
Suppose A and B are two honest participating entities trying to set up a shared
secret key through a key agreement protocol, and O is an active malicious entity.
An unknown key-share attack on a key agreement protocol is an attack through
which O causes one of the two honest entities, say A, to believe that it shares akey with O, but it actually shares the key with the other honest entity B, and
B believes that the key is shared with A. So, at the end of the protocol, O can
act on behalf of B to interact with A. There are a number of papers studying
unknown key-share attack and its application on a number of protocols, e.g. [3],
[5], [9], [12], and [14].
We can simplify the original ﬂow representation of the drive-host authenti-
cation scheme displayed in [2, Section 4.3] into the one shown in Figure 2 by
taking into consideration only the core steps involved in authentication and key
agreement. A similar ﬂow diagram is also provided in [2, Section 4.3].
Drive Host
1.
Hn, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
2.
Dn, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
3. Dv=DkG
Sigdrive(Hn||Dv), Dv − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
4.
Sighost(Dn||Hv), Hv ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
5. Bk=DkHv=DkHkG Bk=HkDv=HkDkG
Fig.2. Simpliﬁed AACS Drive-Host Authentication Protocol
1. Host initiates a session with Drive. It sends a random nonce Hn and its
certiﬁcate Hcert to Drive. Drive veriﬁes the signature of the Host certiﬁcate
using the AACS LA public key. If the veriﬁcation fails, Drive shall abort this
authentication procedure.
2. Drive replies to the Host with a random nonce Dn and its certiﬁcate Dcert.
Host veriﬁes the signature of the Drive certiﬁcate using the AACS LA public
key. If the veriﬁcation fails, Host shall abort this authentication procedure.
3. Drive generates a 160-bit random number Dk and uses it to calculate a
point Dv on the elliptic curve (G is the base point of the elliptic curve).
Drive then creates a signature of the concatenation of Hn and Dv. Drive
sends the digital signature and Dv to Host. Host veriﬁes the signature, and
aborts the session on failure.
4. Host generates a 160-bit random number Hk and uses it to calculate a point
Hv on the elliptic curve. Host then creates a signature of the concatenation of
Dn and Hv. Host sends the digital signature and Hv to Drive. Drive veriﬁes
the signature, and aborts the session on failure.
On the last step, both Drive and Host calculate the shared secret bus key Bk.An attacker, DriveOscar, which is also a legitimate drive, can use a parallel
session to deploy an unknown key-share attack. Figure 3 shows the diagram of
the attack.
Drive DriveOscar Host
1.
Hn, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − −
2.
Hn, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − −
3.
Dn, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
4.
Dn, DO cert − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
5. Dv=DkG
Sigd(Hn||Dv), Dv − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
6.
Sigdo(Hn||Dv), Dv − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
7.
Sigh(Dn||Hv), Hv ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
8.
Sigh(Dn||Hv), Hv ← − − − − − − − − − − − − −
9. Bk=DkHv=DkHkG Bk=HkDv=HkDkG
Fig.3. Unknown Key-Share Attack on AACS Drive-Host Authentication Protocol
The attack works in this way:
1. Host initiates a session with DriveOscar. It sends its random nonce Hn and
certiﬁcate Hcert to DriveOscar.
2. DriveOscar relays the traﬃc to Drive as if Host is initiating a session with
Drive. Drive receives Hn and Hcert and veriﬁes that Hcert is valid.
3. Drive sends back its random nonce Dn and certiﬁcate Dcert to Host, which
of course get intercepted by DriveOscar.
4. DriveOscar relays the random nonce Dn to Host, however, it does not relay
the Drive’s certiﬁcate. Instead, it sends its own certiﬁcate DO cert to Host.
Host receives DO cert as well as Dn. It is tricked into believing that DriveOscar
has generated this random nonce. Host veriﬁes DriveOscar’s certiﬁcate, and
the veriﬁcation should pass because DriveOscar is a legitimate drive.
5. Following the AACS drive-host authentication protocol, Drive generates a
random number Dk and calculates a point Dv on the elliptic curve. Drive
then creates a signature of the concatenation of Hn and Dv. Drive sends the
digital signature and Dv to Host.6. DriveOscar relays Dv to Host. However, it creates its own signature of the
concatenation of Hn and Dv using its private key. It can do so because both
Hn and Dv are available to it. It sends this signature instead of Drive’s
signature to Host. Host veriﬁes the signature using DriveOscar’s public key
obtained from DO cert. The veriﬁcation should pass.
7. Host generates a random number Hk and calculates a point Hv on the elliptic
curve. Drive then creates a signature of the concatenation of Dn and Hv.
Drive sends the digital signature and Hv to DriveOscar.
8. DriveOscar relays the traﬃc to Drive. Drive veriﬁes the signature, and the
veriﬁcation should pass.
By the time the session is complete, Drive has accepted Host, and it can
calculate the shared bus key Bk. On the other hand, Host does not accept Drive
because it simply does not know the existence of Drive from this interaction.
Instead, it has accepted DriveOscar. Host can also calculate the same shared bus
key Bk.
Although DriveOscar does not know the secret bus key Bk in the end, it has
tricked Host into believing that it shares the bus key with DriveOscar. Host thinks
that it is talking to DriveOscar while actually it is interacting with Drive.
This attack could be exploited in practice. For example, suppose that DriveA
is revoked. Then it can employ this attack to ask DriveB, which is not revoked, to
impersonate it. Since the host only sees DriveB’s certiﬁcate, the authentication
procedure should complete successfully. In this way, DriveA can still interact
with the host after the authentication procedure. It has eﬀectively bypassed the
authentication procedure.
Such an attack is enabled due to the fact that in the last two ﬂows DriveOscar
can simply copy the traﬃc. This problem can be ﬁxed by including the entity
IDs in the signature. (See Section 3.4).
3.3 Weakness 3: Man-In-The-Middle Attack
The adversarial goal in an attack to a mutual authentication protocol is to cause
an honest participant to “accept” after a ﬂow in which the adversary is active. To
consider a mutual authentication protocol secure, it has to satisfy the following
two conditions:
1. Suppose A and B are the two participants in a session of the protocol and
they are both honest. Suppose also that the adversary is passive. Then A
and B will both “accept”.
2. If the adversary is active during a given ﬂow of the protocol, then no honest
participant will “accept” after that ﬂow.
Figure 4 shows an attack which might not be as powerful and practical as
the previous one. Nonetheless, it shows a weakness in this protocol.
In this case, Oscar could be a polynomial time adversary with the ability
to listen and to modify the traﬃc. Notice that in step 2 when Oscar relays theDrive Oscar Host
1.
Hn, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Hn, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − −
2.
Dn, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
D0
n, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − →
3. Dv=DkG
Sigd(Hn||Dv), Dv − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
Sigd(Hn||Dv), Dv − − − − − − − − − − − − →
4. Host has “accepted”, Oscar wins
Sigh(D0
n||Hv), Hv ← − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
Bk=HkDv=HkDkG
Fig.4. A Trivial Man-In-The-Middle Attack
traﬃc from Drive to Host, it modiﬁes the random nonce Dn generated by Drive
into a diﬀerent one D0
n. This does not make Host terminate the session. In step 3,
after Host has successfully veriﬁed Drive’s signature, it “accepts”. This violates
condition 2 mentioned above, hence the protocol should not be considered secure.
A moment of reﬂection regarding this attack reveals that we do not really
need the two nonces “Hn” and “Dn”.
3.4 Improved Scheme
Since the scheme makes use of certiﬁcates, we can improve it using a simpliﬁed
Station-to-Station key agreement protocol (STS). STS protocol is a key agree-
ment scheme based on Diﬃe-Hellman scheme that provides mutual authentica-
tion. For more information on STS protocols, please refer to [8], [13, Chapter
11], [10].
Drive Host
1.
Hv, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
2. Dv=DkG
Sigdrive(IDhost||Dv||Hv), Dv, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
3.
Sighost(IDdrive||Hv||Dv)
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
4. Bk=DkHv=DkHkG Bk=HkDv=HkDkG
Fig.5. Improved Scheme Based on the Station-to-Station Protocol
Figure 5 shows the improved drive-host authentication scheme based on STS.
This modiﬁcation solves both problems stated in weakness 2 and 3 (a securityproof is given in the next section). In addition, it improves the eﬃciency of the
original protocol, because the number of interactions between Drive and Host is
reduced.
1. Host initiates a session with Drive. It generates a 160-bit random number
Hk and uses it to calculate a point Hv on the elliptic curve. It sends the
Hv and its certiﬁcate Hcert to Drive. Drive veriﬁes the signature of the Host
certiﬁcate using the AACS LA public key. If the veriﬁcation fails, Drive shall
abort this session.
2. Drive generates a 160-bit random number Dk and uses it to calculate a point
Dv on the elliptic curve. Drive then creates a signature of the concatenation
of the Host ID, Dv, and Hv. Drive sends the digital signature, Dv, and
its certiﬁcate Dcert to Host. Host veriﬁes the signature created by Drive:
verdrive(IDhost||Dv||Hv,Drive0s signature)
? = true, and it also veriﬁes the
signature of the Drive certiﬁcate. If any of the two veriﬁcations fail, Host
shall abort the session.
3. Host creates a signature of the concatenation of the Drive ID, Hv, and Dv
and sends it to Drive. Drive veriﬁes the signature: verhost(IDdrive||Hv||Dv,
Host0s signature)
? = true, and aborts the session on failure.
At the end of the protocol, both Drive and Host are able to establish the
shared secret bus key Bk. Points Hv and Dv in this protocol also play a role as
random challenges.
The new protocol solves all the aforementioned problems. Since the random
challenges Hn and Dn are omitted, it enables the drive and the host to perform
fewer interactions, and is therefore more eﬃcient.
Appendix A shows a ﬂow representation of the entire improved drive-host
authentication protocol.
4 Security of the Improved Drive-Host Authentication
Scheme
The improved scheme protects against the unknown key-shared attack mentioned
earlier.
In Figure 6, a question mark following a signature indicates that the adver-
sary is unable to compute this signature. At step 3, the signature which Host
sends to DriveOscar contains DriveOscar’s ID not Drive’s ID because Host believes
that it is talking to DriveOscar. DriveOscar cannot compute Host’s signature on
the string IDdrive||Hv||Dv because he does not know Host’s private signing key.
As a result, unknown key-share attack is thwarted.
After step 2, Host “accepts” the authentication because it should successfully
verify DriveOscar’s signature and certiﬁcate. This does not violate the second
condition of considering a mutual authentication protocol secure mentioned in
Section 3.3, because Host is authenticating with DriveOscar.
The improved scheme also protects against man-in-the-middle attack.Drive DriveOscar Host
1.
Hv, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Hv, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
2. Dv=DkG
Sigd(IDhost||Dv||Hv),
Dv, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
Sigdo(IDhost||Dv||Hv),
Dv, DO cert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
3.
Sigh(IDdrive||Hv||Dv)?
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Sigh(IDdrive Oscar||Hv||Dv)
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Bk=HkDv=HkDkG
Fig.6. Protection Against Unknown Key-Share Attack
Drive Oscar Host
1.
H0
v, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Hv, Hcert ← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − Hv=HkG
2. Dv=DkG
Sigd(IDhost||Dv||H0
v), Dv, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
Sigd(IDhost||D0
v||Hv)?, D0
v, Dcert − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − →
3.
Sigh(IDdrive||H0
v||Dv)?
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Sigh(IDdrive Oscar||Hv||D0
v)
← − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Fig.7. Prevention of Man-In-The-Middle Attack
As shown in Figure 7, if Oscar modiﬁes Hv, he then would not be able to
produce Host’s signature on IDdrive||H0
v||Dv because he does not know Host’s
private signing key. Likewise, if Oscar modiﬁes Dv, he then would not be able to
produce Drive’s signature on IDhost||D0
v||Hv because he does not know Drive’s
private signing key.
Of course, we want to show that the improved scheme is secure against all
possible attacks, not just two particular attacks. Hence, we need to show that the
improved scheme is a secure mutual authentication scheme, and that it provides
assurances regarding knowledge of the shared secret key. For the proof of security
of our improved scheme, an informal treatment based on [13, Chapter 11] is given
in the rest of this section.
4.1 Secure Mutual Authentication
A secure mutual authentication has to satisfy the two conditions described in
Section 3.3. Let us ﬁrst show that our improved scheme satisﬁes the ﬁrst condi-
tion.
Since no one is modifying the traﬃc, if the adversary is passive and the
two participants are honest they should successfully authenticate themselves to
each other and both compute the shared secret key as in the Diﬃe-Hellman key
agreement scheme. Assuming the intractability of the Decision Diﬃe-Hellman
problem, the inactive adversary cannot compute the share secret key.To prove that our improved scheme satisﬁes the second condition, let us
assume that the adversary is active. The adversary wants to fool at least one of
the two participants to “accept” after a ﬂow in which he is active. We show that
the adversary will not scceed in this way, except with a very small probability.
Deﬁnition 1. A signature scheme is (,Q,T)-secure if the adversary cannot
construct a valid signature for any new message with probability greater than ,
given that he has previously seen at most Q diﬀerent valid signatures, and given
that his computation time is limited to T.
Deﬁnition 2. A mutual authentication scheme is (,Q,T)-secure if the adver-
sary cannot fool any honest participants into accepting with probability greater
than , given that he has observed at most Q previous sessions between the honest
participants, and given that the his computation time is at most T.
Time T is usually chosen to be very long so that by the time the adversary
successfully computes the correct result the value of the result has decreased to
an insigniﬁcant level. For simplicity of notation, we omit the time parameter.
Q is a speciﬁed security parameter. Depending on the application, it could be
assigned with various values. The probability  is usually chosen to be so small
that the chance of success is negligible.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Sig is an (,Q)-secure signature scheme, and suppose
that random challenges Hv and Dv are k bits in length. Then the scheme shown
in Figure 5 is a (Q/2k−1 + 2,Q)-secure mutual authentication scheme.
Proof. The adversary, Oscar, observes Q previous sessions of the protocol before
making his attack. A successful attack by Oscar is to deceive at least one honest
participant in a new session into accepting after he is active in one or more ﬂows.
1. Oscar tries to deceive Host. In order to make Host accept, it has to receive a
signature signed by Drive containing the Host ID and the random challenge
Hv. There are only two ways for Oscar to acquire such a signature: either
from a previously observed session or by computing it himself.
To observe such a signature from a previous session, Hv has to be used in
that session. The probability that Host has already used the challenge in a
speciﬁc previous session is 1/2k. There are at most Q previous sessions under
consideration, so the probability that Hv was used as a challenge in one of
these previous sessions is at most Q/2k. If this happens, Oscar can re-use
Drive’s signature and D0
v (which may or may not be the same as Dv) from
that session to fool Host.
To compute such a signature himself, Oscar has at most a chance of , since
Sig is (, Q)-secure.
Therefore, Oscar’s probability of deceiving Host is at most Q/2k + .
2. Oscar tries to deceive Drive. This is quite similar to the case we have dis-
cussed above. In order to fool Drive, Oscar has to have a legitimate signature
signed by Host. As in the previous case, the two ways for Oscar to acquiresuch a signature are either from a previously observed session or by comput-
ing it himself.
To observe such a signature from a previous session, Oscar re-uses a Hv
from a previous session S to send to Drive, and hopes that Drive will reply
with the same Dv as in S so that he can re-use the corresponding signature.
This happens with probability 1/2k. The best case scenario for the adversary
would be that all Q previously observed sessions have the same Hv. Because
if any Dv from the Q sessions is re-used by Drive, Oscar can then re-use
the corresponding signature to fool Drive. Hence, Oscar has at most Q/2k
probability to re-use Host’s signature to deceive Drive.
Again since Sig is (, Q)-secure, Oscar can compute such a signature with a
probability of at most .
Therefore, Oscar’s probability of deceiving Drive is at most Q/2k + .
Summing up, the probability for Oscar to deceive one of Host or Drive is at most
(Q/2k + ) + (Q/2k + ) = Q/2k−1 + 2.
4.2 Implicit Key Conﬁrmation
Now, let us see what we can infer about the improved scheme if Host or Drive
“accepts”. Firstly, suppose that Host “accepts”. Because the improved scheme is
a secure mutual authentication scheme, Host can be conﬁdent that it has really
been communicating with Drive and that the adversary was inactive before the
last ﬂow. Assuming that Drive is honest and that it has executed the scheme
according to the speciﬁcations, Host can be conﬁdent that Drive can compute
the value of the secret bus key, and that no one other than Drive can compute
the value of the bus key.
Let us consider in more detail why Host should believe that Drive can com-
pute the bus key. The reason for this belief is that Host has received Drive’s
signature on the values Hv and Dv, so it is reasonable for Host to infer that
Drive knows these two values. Now, since Drive is a honest participant and exe-
cuted the scheme according to the speciﬁcations, Host can infer that Drive knows
the values of Dk. Drive is able to compute the value of the bus key, provided that
he knows the values of Hv and Dk. Of course, there is no guarantee to Host that
Drive has actually computed the bus key at the moment when Host “accepts”.
We can be sure that no one else can compute the bus key because Dk is meant
to be known to Drive only.
The analysis from the point of view of Drive is very similar. If Drive “accepts”,
then it is conﬁdent that it has really been communicating with Host, and that
the bus key can be computed only by Host and no one else.
The improved scheme does not make immediate use of the new bus key,
so we do not have explicit key conﬁrmation. However, it does achieve implicit
key conﬁrmation. Moreover, it is always possible to augment any key agreement
scheme with implicit key conﬁrmation so that it achieves explicit key conﬁr-
mation (the SIGMA protocol is an eﬃcient key agreement scheme similar to
STS which provides explicit key conﬁrmation [10]), if so desired. In essence, the
improved scheme provides authenticated key agreement with key conﬁrmation.5 Conclusion
We have described three weaknesses in the AACS drive-host authentication
scheme. Speciﬁcally, the scheme is susceptible to unknown key-share attack and
man-in-the-middle attack. As a goal to improve the scheme to resist all kinds of
attacks, we have modiﬁed the original scheme based on a simpliﬁed Station-to-
Station key agreement protocol to provide secure mutual authentication as well
as authenticated key agreement with key conﬁrmation. In addition, our modiﬁed
scheme achieves better eﬃciency than the original scheme.
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Drive Host
1. MKB // Verify MKB and DRL signa-
tures. Abort if signatures are
not valid.
2. Compare version of stored
DRL to DRL in MKB. If DRL
in MKB is not newer, use
stored DRL. Otherwise, use
DRL in MKB, and store it for
later reference.
3. Verify MKB and HRL signa-
tures. Abort if signatures are
not valid.
4. Compare version of stored
HRL to HRL in MKB. If HRL
in MKB is not newer, use
stored HRL. Otherwise, use
HRL in MKB, and store it for
later reference.
5. AGID //
6. Generate 160-bit random
number Hk.
7. Calculate Hv = HkG where
G is the base point of the el-
liptic curve.
8.
Hv, Hcert oo
9. Verify host certiﬁcate type
and length. Abort on failure.
10. Verify signature on host cer-
tiﬁcate. Abort on failure.
11. Check HRL and abort if Host
ID is found.12. Request a point on the ellip-
tic curve Dv, signature, and
drive certiﬁcate.
13. Generate 160-bit random
value Dk.
14. Calculate Dv = DkG where
G is the base point of the el-
liptic curve.
15. Calculate Dsig as the signa-
ture of IDhostkDvkHv using
the drive’s private key.
16.
Dsig, Dv, Dcert//
17. Verify drive certiﬁcate type
and length. Abort on failure.
18. Verify signature on drive cer-
tiﬁcate. Abort on failure.
19. Check DRL and abort if
Drive ID is found.
20. Verify Dsig and abort on fail-
ure.
21. Calculate Hsig as the signa-
ture of IDdrivekHvkDv using
the host’s private key.
22.
Hsig oo
23. Verify Hsig and abort on fail-
ure.
24. Calculate Bus Key Bk as the
128 least signiﬁcant bits of
x-coord(DkHv).
25. Calculate Bus Key Bk as the
128 least signiﬁcant bits of
x-coord(HkDv).